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ABSTRACT 
The research question we address is whether state laws that require health 
insurance policies to provide coverage for specified benefits have affected the size of the 
population without any private sector health insurance coverage.  The laws are often 
alleged to increase the cost of insurance premiums and thus reduce incentives for smaller 
employers to offer and for individuals to purchase health insurance.   
Using data from the United States Census Current Population Survey (CPS) from 
1996 to 2002, we measure the effects of 2 sets of high cost benefit mandates on the 
probability for workers to have health insurance through their employer. We use both 
individual and state level analyses. Generally we find weak and statistically insignificant 
effects associated with benefit mandates, though we see evidence that this relationship 
grows stronger over time. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Private health insurance has been traditionally governed at the state level.  In the 
past twenty years it has become increasingly popular for state legislatures to pass laws 
mandating that certain services, health providers, or benefits be covered in healthcare 
plans.  As Gabel and Jensen (1989) assert, health insurance mandates are a way for state 
governments to satisfy constituents without increasing taxes.  Predictably, these laws are 
extremely popular with state legislators who seek to gain political influence at little to no 
fiscal cost.  Bunce et al (2007) have identified no less than 1,800 such laws across the 
United States. 
State healthcare mandates can be grouped in three different categories:  
• Coverage mandates require that insurance plans cover particular groups of 
individuals, such as terminated employees or certain dependents.  
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• Provider mandates require that insurance plans cover services provided by certain 
healthcare professionals, such as dentists or chiropractors. 
• Benefit mandates require that a minimum level of service to be provided by an 
insurance plan.  These laws can range from a guaranteed period of hospital stay 
for mothers after birth to coverage for prostate cancer testing. 
We focus primarily on the effects of benefit mandates, as these laws have experienced the 
most frequent passage over the past decade.  We study the relationship between the 
enactment of such legislation and the insurance coverage status of workers.  Specifically, 
we analyze employees of small firms since the vast majority of large companies tend to 
use self-insurance and thus exempt themselves from mandates.  
 
II. THE DEBATE ON MANDATES 
A. Major Arguments for Mandates 
As explained by Summers (1989), arguments for the implementation of state 
mandates originate from a paternalistic line of reasoning.  Proponents for state mandates 
contend that purchasers may not realize the full value of a certain benefit and could forgo 
it when constructing an insurance plan at a greater cost.  For example, one may not 
perceive the coverage of prostate cancer testing to be necessary, but the cost pales in 
comparison to the expense of ensuing treatments when diagnosed.  Thus, governments 
must intervene to ensure that consumers buy the optimal amount of insurance.  
Proponents also argue that mandates are a method for governments to assist 
persons with chronic illnesses.  If benefits for such diseases are not required across an 
entire population, insurance companies will experience adverse selection – as described 
by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) – when healthier individuals decline coverage.  
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Mandates effectively spread the costs of expensive treatments across the entire 
population and ease financial burden on those who are already incapacitated. 
B. Arguments against Mandates 
The economic argument against state mandates centers on inefficiency from the 
increase in healthcare costs from the imposition of minimum levels of service.  To 
require consumers to accept an expensive package with benefits neither needed nor 
wanted may cause them to leave the insurance system altogether, as demonstrated by the 
quip: Why offer “Cadillac coverage” to one who only desires “Chevrolet coverage?”  
This decrease in the percentage of workers with private health insurance due to mandates, 
known as displacement, is purported to be a major factor in the large and growing 
number of uninsured workers in the United States.  
 
III. EXISTING LITERATURE 
There already exists an extensive body of academic literature that analyzes 
various aspects of state mandates.  Jensen and Morrissey (1999), Laugesen et al (2006), 
and Monheit and Rizzo (2007) provide a complete review.   Of these studies, there have 
been several that examine the displacement effects of state healthcare mandates at a 
national level.  The analyses provide mixed results that do not easily lend themselves to a 
conclusion. 
Some researchers have found large and statistically significant displacement 
effects.  Controlling for a number of demographic and employment factors, Gabel and 
Jensen (1992) examined firm data and reported that 20% to 25% of companies that did 
not offer insurance coverage would do so if all state mandates were eliminated.  Sloan 
and Conover (1998) analyzed data from 1989 to 1984 using probit and found significant 
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large and negative displacement.  They estimated that every mandate passed decreases 
the percentage of workers with insurance coverage by 0.4%.  They extrapolated this 
finding to assert that the average state would experience a 4% increase in the percentage 
of workers with insurance coverage if all mandates were eliminated.   
Others have found little or no effect.  For the years 1979, 1983, and 1988, Gruber 
(1994b) developed a similar probit model at the individual level to measure displacement 
from 5 high-cost mandates and found no significant effect.  He attributed his results to the 
phenomenon that most insurance plans already provided a level of coverage above state-
mandated levels.  Gruber was one of the first to include varying costs of mandates to 
reflect the reality that some benefits increase insurance premiums more than others. 
Gruber (1994a) also found through analysis of mandated maternity benefits that in the 
face of costly mandates, employers do not withdraw health insurance coverage but rather 
reduce the wages of the group of workers most likely to value the benefit.  Thus, 
displacement should be uncommon. Also, other workers will not drop insurance as there 
is no additional payment required for superfluous benefits.   
 
IV. RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
 After a review of the existing literature, we believe there are two main reasons 
that a reexamination of the effects of state benefit mandates would add value to 
discussion on these laws.   
 
A. Availability of New Data 
 First, studies on benefit mandates have generally reviewed specific laws in 
specific states.  According to Laugesen et al (2006), relatively few analyses measure 
effects of these laws across the United States; the obstacle of compiling data on a national 
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scale is difficult to overcome.  However, Laugesen et al (2006) have recently reviewed 
the legal codes of all 50 states in the United States and compiled a comprehensive 
database of all state benefit mandates from 1949 to 2002.  The dataset is one of the first 
of its kind and allows for timely comparative studies of state mandates over the entire 
country 
 
B. Changes in States’ Legislative Nature 
There have not been any comparative statistical analyses of the displacement 
effect of mandates since 1998 and over the past decade the character of state health 
insurance mandates has changed tremendously. Laugesen et al (2006) found that earlier 
legislation was generally comprised of provider mandates so to include other health 
professionals, such as chiropractors and dentists, in insurance plans. Recently, legislation 
has primarily consisted of benefit laws.  And perhaps because benefit laws cause 
miniscule increases in premiums compared to coverage or provide ones the number of 
benefit mandates has increased tremendously.  By analyzing recent waves of widespread 
mandates, we may find unmeasured effects.  
 
V. DATA SOURCES  
The primary data source for our study is the March Supplement of the U.S. 
Census CPS from 1996 to 2002.  Population observations are part of the Integrated Public 
Use Micro-data Series (IPUMS) as provided by the Minnesota Population Center.  We 
constrain the sample to fit several requirements: 
• Persons must be employed, either on a part-time or full-time basis.   
• Persons must be employed at firms with less than 100 employees.   
• Persons have to be under the age of 65 and thus ineligible for Medicare benefits. 
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• Persons have to have a known union coverage status – in other words, listed as 
covered by a union or not – since this variable is found to be highly significant in 
determining whether an individual has obtained health insurance through 
employment.1 
The final dataset comprised of 33,881 workers. Descriptive statistics on the sample can 
be found in Table 1. 
 Information on state mandates is supplied by Dr. Miriam Laugesen, who provided 
a comprehensive list of benefit laws passed from 1995 to 2003.  Each piece of legislation 
is classified by state, year of passage, and 1 of 76 benefit types.  However, this list does 
not include information about any mandates passed before 1995. 
 Finally, we determine the relative costs of benefit mandates: the percentage 
increase of premiums should increase if the law is passed.  Since the calculation of a 
given mandate’s effect on premiums requires actuarial expertise and in depth knowledge 
of a state’s population, we use reports commissioned by state governments. Specifically, 
we studied cost analyses from the legislatures of Maryland, Virginia, and Texas.  Table 2 
shows the estimated premium increases for all mandates compared across states.  Since 
the required levels of coverage from laws for the same benefit vary from state to state, we 
average values to liberally approximate percent premium increases. 
 
VI. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK  
A. Individual Level Linear Probability Model 
                                                 
1 The imposition of the union coverage status constraint reduced the number of observations in the sample 
to 20% of the original size.  The wisdom of this requirement is discussed in Section VIII. 
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To first estimate the displacement of state mandates, we construct an un-weighted 
regression model controlling for a large number of external effects.2  This approach is 
taken from an analysis by Gruber (1994b) with modifications to adjust for changes in the 
availability of state mandate data.3  The model is:  
jtjtijtjtijt MANCOSTXINSCOV εββδββα τ +++++= −14321*  
where INSCOV*ijt = 1 when worker i in state j in year t is covered by insurance and 0 if 
not.  The independent covariates are a set of state and year dummy variables for fixed 
effects specifications, a set of demographic and job variables, and a variable which 
approximates the influence of mandate laws. 
τ t is set of year dummies and δj is a set of state dummy variables meant to account 
for fixed effects.  τ t allows for omitted time effects while δj is meant to control for the 
state group effects, including the effects of mandates passed before 1996 as well as any 
other inherent state variation. 
Xijt is a set of 11 demographic and job variables for worker i that would have 
bearing on a worker’s propensity for coverage, including: 
• 3 continuous variables for age, the square of age, and degrees of educational 
attainment. 
• 7 dummy variables for non-white race, female sex, married marital status, tenure 
for less than 1 year, coverage by a union contract, part time employment, and 
employment in a firm with less than 25 persons. 
                                                 
2 In the probit analyses we did not use the probability weights for observations as given by the CPS.  These 
weights are generally used to correct sampling error and to make analyses more representative of the 
United States populace.  The inclusion of sampling weights does greatly increase the significance of probit 
coefficients; however for comparison to Gruber’s 1994 results they are not used in this study.  
3 We used a variation of Gruber’s 1994 study because it generally known, as per Monheit and Rizzo (2007), 
as one of the strongest analyses of the displacement effect. 
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• 1 interaction variable for female sex crossed with married marital status. 
The hope is these variables will capture much of the variation due to demographic and 
job factors so that we may better measure displacement from mandates. 
MANCOSTjt-1 is an index of mandate dummy variables weighted by their 
percentage cost to insurance premiums; its coefficient β4 should measure the amount of 
displacement effect of benefit mandates.  We introduce this covariate at a lag of 1 year to 
allow for delay in the effect of a given law.  The general structure is: 
kkjt MANDATECMANDATECMANDATECMANCOST *...** 22111 +++=−  
Each MANDATEk is a dummy variable which is 1 when that particular mandate k has 
been passed in state j during 1996 to year t 0 if not.  Ck is a measure of the potential 
percentage premium increase from each mandate k. 
The ideal MANCOST index would be inclusive of all benefit types.  However, due 
to collinearity concerns only a few mandates are included: the presences of certain 
mandates within a state are unlikely to be independent of each other.  Gruber chose 5 
high-cost mandates: mandated minimum benefits for alcoholism treatment, drug abuse 
treatment, and mental illness, mandated coverage for chiropractic services; and mandated 
continuation of health insurance benefits for terminated employees and their dependents.  
Gruber’s mandate index equation is: 
PREMTAXCONTCOV
CHIRODRUGALCOHOLTHMENTALHEALMANCOST GruberOld
++
+++=
*3
*5.1*5
 
Using state-commissioned reports, we modify the weightings to reflect the costs 
of these benefits during the time period of 1996 to 2002.  We do not include the 
continuation of coverage mandate as the 1996 Health and Insurance Portability and 
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Accountability Act effectively required guaranteed renewal for terminated employees and 
dependents.  We also omit premium tax rates from the mandate index as values were 
found to be relatively constant over the time window.  The revised index is:  
CHIRODRUGALCOHOLTHMENTALHEALMANCOSTNewGruber +++= *2  
By 1996, most states had already passed the mandates specified by Gruber and 
there was very little variation in the mandate index; thus we created a new mandate index 
based on benefit mandates that were expensive and prevalent during the study time 
period.  Indeed, Table 1 shows that this new benefit mandate cost index had a higher 
mean value across the sample.  We find mandated benefits for prostate cancer testing 
(PSA), diabetes treatment, temporo-mandibular joint syndrome (TMJ) treatment, and 
well child care to cause the largest percent increases in health insurance premiums.  
Legislation requiring these 4 was also common from 1996-2002. 4  Therefore, we devise 
a new benefit mandate cost index: 
WELLCHILDSBONESJOINTDIABETESPSAMANCOSTNew +++=  
Each of the benefits in the index can be estimated to increase premiums by about 1 
percent.  This weighting also allows for the mandate index to simply act as a sum of 
several dummy variables.   
B. Individual-Level Probit Model 
 The linear probability regression is a suitable method to gain a rough 
understanding of the effects of the covariates, but a probit model is developed as a more 
                                                 
4 Several very expensive mandates were omitted from the benefit mandate index because they were 
required at the federal level.  A number of benefit mandates created specifically for women, such as 
minimum maternity stay, obstetrician coverage, and mammography, were also found to be costly but were 
not included due to the 1996 the United States Congress passed the Newborn and Mothers Protection Act 
and the 1998 Women’s Health and Cancer Rights Act.  Also, mental health parity is known as a 
particularly expensive benefit but has been mandated nationally by the 1996 Mental Health Parity Act.  We 
believe that such developments might confound results.   
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appropriate method of classification.  Again, this methodology is taken from a previous 
study by Gruber (1994b): 
 
)
(],,,|1*Pr[
143
211
−
−
++
++Φ==
jtijt
jtjtijtjtijt
MANCOSTX
MANCOSTXINSCOV
ββ
δββαδ ττ
 
 INSCOV*ijt = 1 when worker i in state j in year t is covered by insurance  
 INSCOV*ijt = 0 if not  
 
INSCOV*ijt is a dummy variable that represents the latent propensity of worker i in state j 
in year t to be covered by insurance provided by his or her employer.  We use the same 
independent covariates for the probit model as the linear probability regression: τ t is a set 
of year dummies, δj is a set of state dummy variables, Xijt is a set of demographic and job 
variables for worker i, and MANCOSTjt-1 is a weighted index of mandate dummy 
variables. Again, the coefficient β4 should measure the amount of displacement effect of 
benefit mandates.    
C. State Level Fixed Effects Aggregate Model 
 Another approach we use is to aggregate our data and apply a fixed effect 
population averaged linear model.  This method allows our analysis to be time invariant 
and also assists us to better measure the change in insurance coverage as the mandate 
index grows.  The equation is:  
121 −++= jtijtijt MANCOSTXINSCOV ββα  
where INSCOVjt is the percentage of workers in state j who have health insurance through 
their employer, Xjt is the mean value of the job and demographic variables across all 
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individuals in state j, and MANCOSTjt-1 is the index of mandate dummy variables.  The 
coefficient β2 should measure the amount of displacement effect of benefit mandates.    
   
VII. RESULTS 
We pair each of the 3 models developed – individual level linear probability, 
individual level probit, and aggregate level fixed effects regression – with the revised 
Gruber and new benefit mandate indices to test for displacement in the CPS sample.  
Each combination of model and mandate index is run in three separate ways: 
• We run 4 dummy variables that correspond to the mandates comprising the index 
in the model and examine the coefficients.   
• We run 1 covariate that is the sum of the 4 individual mandate dummies 
comprising the index in the model and examine the coefficient.  We perform this 
analysis because the 4 individual mandates dummy variables may be collinear. It 
is necessary to examine the overall significance of the set. 
• Finally, to better approximate the increase in premiums due to mandates, we run 
the weighted mandate cost index in the model and examine the coefficient. 
In total, we run 18 separate analyses: each of the mandate cost indices is used separately 
in the 3 models in 3 ways.   
 Generally we find weak and insignificant displacement though there is some 
evidence that the effect of certain mandates has grown since last measurement. 
 
A. Individual Level Analyses 
  Table 4 displays the basic results from individual level analyses using the revised 
Gruber mandate index.  Column 1 presents the results for a linear probability regression 
while column 7 shows the marginal probabilities from the probit model: as one may 
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observe, the coefficients are very similar.  3 of the 4 mandate dummies have negative 
coefficients. In particular, the coefficient for alcoholism treatment mandates is highly 
significant and probit analysis suggests a 19% decrease in coverage probability with the 
passage of such a law.  However these results may be meaningless: the presence of a 
substance abuse mandate is also highly significant but the marginal probability estimates 
an increase in coverage probability of 8%.  Indeed, both the sum of mandate dummy 
variables and the weighted mandate index have insignificant negative coefficients.  The 
marginal probability of the weighted index has a magnitude of approximately 2.2%; this 
value implies that the imposition of the entire set of mandates would lower the 
probability of insurance by a substantial 11%.   
Columns 3 and 6 in Table 4 are Gruber’s results (1994b) from 1979 to 1988 and 
allow for side by side comparison with our analysis of data from 1996 to 2002.  We find 
that while the linear probability and probit models differ slightly in construction, there is 
a remarkable similarity in the coefficients and standard errors for all demographic and job 
variables.  Also, we note that there is a marked increase in the significance and 
magnitude of the coefficients of the mandate index and its components.  This 
phenomenon is perhaps a consequence of the different models but also may be a sign that 
the displacement effect of these laws has increased over time. 
 Table 5 displays the basic results from individual level analyses using the new 
benefit mandate index that we created.  When we compare the linear probability results in 
columns 1 and probit marginal probabilities in column 5, we see again the coefficients 
are almost identical.  However, there is very little evidence of a displacement effect.  For 
the set of mandate dummy variables, only 1 out of the 4 coefficients is negative and then 
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only slightly so.  The weighted mandate index – which is also the sum of mandate 
dummies – has an insignificant negative coefficient.  The marginal probability from the 
mandate index is estimated at 0.66%; consequently, we can extrapolate a decline of 
2.64% in coverage probability for a given worker if all 4 benefit mandates were imposed. 
 For all individual level analyses, all of the job and demographic variables have the 
effects predicted by economic theory.  Age, education, female sex, married marital status, 
and union coverage increase the probability that a given worker is covered by insurance.  
Non-white race, female sex with married marital status, tenure less than 1 year, part time 
work status, and employment at a company with less than 25 people lower the chances an 
individual has healthcare coverage. 
 
B. Aggregate State Level Analyses 
 Table 6 reports the output from the fixed effects regression with both mandate 
indices.  Columns 1 and 2 present the results from the application of the revised Gruber 
index.  We note that the coefficients for the 4 separate mandate dummies, the sum of 
dummy variables, and the weighted mandate index are all negative but insignificant.  The 
coefficient of the mandate index suggests that the percentage of workers with 
employment-based health insurance in a given state would decrease by approximately 4% 
if all 4 benefits were required. 
Columns 3 and 4 display findings from the use of the new benefits index.  Again, 
we find that none of the mandate dummy variables are significant and only the dummy 
for prostate cancer testing is negative.  The weighted mandate index variable, which also 
serves as the sum of dummies variable, is insignificant as expected.  The coefficient 
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implies a miniscule 0.5% decrease in the percentage of workers with coverage in a given 
state with the imposition of all 4 of the component benefit mandates. 
 With the fixed effects model, many of the coefficients values of job and 
demographic variables become insignificant and nonsensical.  This development is 
typical of analyses using aggregation because much of the original variation in the 
observations is lost.  Table 6 shows that only 2 covariates are statistically significant: 
both increased proportions of part time employees and small firms in a given state tend to 
decrease the percentage of the state’s population with insurance coverage.   
 
VIII. MODEL LIMITATIONS 
A. Use of Union Status in the Creation of CPS Sample 
The construction of our data sample may be a point of contention, specifically the 
constraint of known union coverage status.  This requirement reduces the original CPS 
sample of 463,000 observations to approximately 20% of the original size.  While our 
analyses found the variable highly significant, the necessity of the union coverage in our 
models is unclear; indeed, analysis with the entire dataset may provide different results.  
In our study, we retain the constraint in this constraint to make results more comparable 
to Gruber’s (1994b). 
 
B. Dummy Variables in the Mandate Cost Index 
One of the most pressing concerns in the analysis is the construction of the 
mandate cost index.  Because we do not have access to data on laws passed before 1996, 
we modify the dummy variables in Gruber’s (1994b) general index formula from 1 if a 
mandate was present the previous year and 0 if not to 1 if a mandate has been passed 
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from 1996 to the previous year and 0 if not.  Thus, we are in effect measuring the change 
in insurance coverage rates due to variation in the cost index.  A more powerful analysis 
would be to revert to the initial mandate index formula as developed by Gruber (1994b).  
We then could accurately measure the total of displacement by only the mandate index 
variable, rather than variation in displacement by a combination of the mandate index and 
relevant state dummy.   
 
C. Type of Mandates Evaluated in the Mandate Cost Index 
Another weakness of our methodology is the use of so few benefits in the creation 
of the benefit mandate index.  Due to concerns of collinearity, we only include 4 benefits. 
However, the 4 that we choose for the variable, while very expensive in comparison to 
other mandated benefits, cannot in sum cause an increase in premium of more than 4%.   
Thus, the displacement we attempt to measure must be very small.   
This assessment embodies a larger issue in the measurement of displacement from 
benefit mandates: such laws may be truly significant only in aggregate.  While one 
provider mandate or coverage mandate can cause substantial increases in premiums, the 
effect of one benefit mandate is trivial.  Indeed, the danger of benefit mandates is that 
state legislatures may pass large numbers of such laws with the impression that each 
increases premiums by only marginal amounts when the compounded result is much 
greater.  The massive proliferation of benefit mandates over the past decade, as 
documented by Laugesen et al (2006), may be a consequence for such an effect.  Thus, 
the methodology that Gruber developed for the measurement of mandate displacement 
may not be appropriate for benefit mandates: perhaps it is necessary to construct a 
statistical model that takes into account all mandates without stirring fears of collinearity.   
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IX. CONCLUSION 
 Generally we measure weak and insignificant displacement from healthcare 
mandates for benefits.  Our analyses are consistent with Gruber’s results (1994b) which 
also found little effect from such laws on small firms’ propensity to offer healthcare 
coverage.  In the three models we created, we only see statistical significance in dummy 
variables for the alcoholism and substance abuse treatment on an individual – but the 
coefficients are of opposite signs and the corresponding mandate index is insignificant.   
However, we find some evidence that the cost of mandates is growing.  For the 
individual level analyses that use the mandate index specified by Gruber, we find an 
increased magnitude and significance of coefficients for all mandate dummy variables 
and the mandate cost index while the coefficients for the job and demographic variables 
remain remarkably similar.  This phenomenon may be evidence that over time the impact 
of benefit mandates has increased but there is not enough data to verify that a trend exists.  
Indeed, further analysis perhaps is necessary to document any further changes.  In 
particular, we hope that future studies will use both present methodologies as well as new 
techniques that can measure the aggregate effects of all mandates in a given state. 
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Table 1: Summary of CPS Data   
  Less than 100 Workers Less than 25 Workers 
Age 37.32 37.10 
  (12.14) (12.35) 
Education 10.72 10.60 
  (2.52) (2.53) 
      
% Female 47.86% 49.09% 
% Non-White Race 12.65% 12.28% 
% Married 56.54% 55.97% 
%Union 6.74% 4.72% 
% Tenure Less Than 1 Year 17.28% 17.54% 
% Part Time 22.97% 26.44% 
% Covered By Insurance 44.32% 35.37% 
      
Average Revised Gruber Index 0.42 0.42 
  (0.79) (0.79) 
Average Benefits Index 1.46 1.47 
  (0.94) (0.94) 
Number of Observations 33,881.00 20,815.00 
 
NOTES: 
1. Numbers is parentheses are standard deviations. 
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Table 2: Mandate Cost Estimation from State Reports        
State Virginia Texas Maryland 
Benefit 
1994 
Group 
2002 Group 
Single 
2002 Group 
Family 
1996 
Group 
2000 
Group 
2001 
Group 2002 Group 
  
Mean 
Value 
  
Final 
Estimation 
Mental Health                   
Mental Inpatient   1.13% 1.29%             
Mental Partial Hospitalization   0.19% 0.11%             
Mental Outpatient   1.31% 1.28%             
Total Mental Health 2.39% 2.63% 2.68%   2.00% 2.35% 2.50% 2.43% 2.00% 
Alcohol and Drug Abuse                   
Abuse Inpatient   0.75% 0.71%             
Abuse Partial Hospitalization   0.06% 0.06%             
Abuse Outpatient   0.58% 0.62%             
Total Alcohol and Drug Abuse 0.77% 1.39% 1.39% 0.60% 0.50% 2.35% 2.50% 1.36% 2.00% 
Chiropractor 0.61% 1.17% 0.92% 0.53%       0.81% 1.00% 
Well Child Care 0.46%       0.60% 0.80% 0.80% 0.67% 1.00% 
Diabetes   1.45% 1.61%     0.50% 0.60% 1.04% 1.00% 
Bones and Joints (TMJ)   1.29% 1.39% 0.09%   0.30% 0.30% 0.67% 1.00% 
Prostate Cancer Testing (PSA)   1.90% 1.59%   0.10% 0.70% 0.70% 1.00% 1.00% 
Notes: 
1. In Maryland, mental health and substance abuse are considered 1 mandate ; therefore the 2.50% was 
estimated for mental health and alcohol and drug abuse. 
2. The final estimation of cost for alcohol and drug abuse treatment is split equally among the costs of 
alcoholism treatment and substance abuse treatment mandates. 
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Table 3:  Gruber Mandate Index Probit Results       
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Insurance Coverage on Job Linear Probability T-statistic Linear Probability (Gruber) Probit T-statistic Probit (Gruber) Marginal Probability Margin Probability (Gruber) 
1 Alcoholism Mandate -0.1681 -2.6319 0.0056 -0.5453 -2.3688 0.0264 -0.1944 0.0074 
   (0.0639)   (0.0186) (0.2302)   (0.0654)    
2 Substance Abuse Mandate 0.0752 3.3132 0.0106 0.2302 3.3091 0.0469 0.0913 0.0132 
   (0.0227)   (0.0242) (0.0696)   (0.0854)    
3 Mental Illness Mandate -0.0097 -0.6923 -0.0294 -0.0275 -0.6298 -0.1102 -0.0108 -0.0309 
   (0.0141)   (0.0246) (0.0437)   (0.0868)    
4 Chiropractor Mandate -0.0122 -0.5675 -0.0103 -0.0406 -0.6096 -0.0126 -0.0158 -0.0036 
   (0.0215)  (0.0175) (0.0667)   (0.0610)     
5 Sum of Mandates -0.0168 -1.6198 -0.0225 -0.0530 -1.6422 -0.0411 -0.0207 -0.0116 
   0.0103   0.0323 0.0322   0.1135     
6 Gruber Mandate Cost Index -0.0088 -1.4233 -0.0020 -0.0274 -1.4192 0.0062 -0.0107 -0.0017 
   0.0062   0.0022 0.0193   0.0076     
7 Age 0.0175 13.5000 0.0108 0.0651 15.2057 0.0390 0.0305 0.0110 
   (0.0013)   (0.0015) (0.0043)   (0.0054)     
8 Age squared -0.0002 -9.3697 -0.0143 -0.0006 -11.3352 -0.0511 -0.0003 -0.0144 
   (0.0000)   (0.0019) (0.0001)   (0.0068)     
9 Education 0.0303 30.7754 0.0208 0.0928 29.6067 0.0709 0.0366 0.0200 
   (0.0010)   (0.0011) (0.0031)   (0.0040)     
10 Non-White Race -0.0561 -7.2660 -0.0534 -0.1649 -6.9722 -0.1854 -0.0503 -0.0519 
   (0.0077)   (0.0107) (0.0237)   (0.0381)     
11 Female Sex 0.0270 3.8318 0.0206 0.0821 3.6184 0.0802 0.0123 0.0224 
   (0.0070)   (0.0091) (0.0227)   (0.0324)     
12 Married Marital Status 0.0318 4.3247 0.0549 0.0819 3.7685 0.1632 0.0189 0.0461 
   (0.0073)   (0.0085) (0.0217)   (0.0292)     
13 Married*Female -0.1743 -17.9390 -0.1706 -0.4889 -16.2475 -0.5361 -0.1644 -0.1514 
   (0.0097)   (0.0114) (0.0301)   (0.0400)     
14 Tenure Less Than 1 Year -0.0579 -9.0439 -0.0984 -0.1623 -8.0413 -0.3429 -0.0561 -0.0988 
   (0.0064)   (0.0075) (0.0202)   (0.0266)     
15 Union Coverage 0.1743 18.1944 0.1970 0.5210 16.6801 0.6966 0.2088 0.1976 
   (0.0096)   (0.0102) (0.0312)   (0.0379)     
16 Part-Time Status -0.2534 -43.2753 -0.2505 -0.8310 -39.5501 -0.9337 -0.2896 -0.2689 
   (0.0059)   (0.0074) (0.0210)   (0.0287)     
17 Small Firm -0.1805 -35.5097 -0.1740 -0.5295 -34.8913 -0.5629 -0.2067 -0.1657 
   (0.0051)   (0.0063) (0.0152)   (0.0215)     
 
NOTES: 
1. Coefficients significant at a=0.05 level are bold. 
2. Numbers is parentheses are robust standard errors. 
3. Dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual is has employment-based 
insurance coverage and 0 if not.   
4. Mandate cost is a linear combination of dummy variables for the passage of a set of 
mandates with the weights as the percentage increase from each mandate.   This variable 
comes from a distinct calculation.   
5. Results in rows 1 through 4 are from entering only a set of 4 mandate dummy 
variables into the respective model. 
6. Results in row 5 are from entering only the sum of the set of 4 mandate dummy 
variable into the respective model. 
7. Results in rows 6 through 17 are from entering only the  weighted mandate index  
variable in the respective model.  
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Table 5: Benefits Mandate Index Probit Results     
  1 2 3 4 5 
 Insurance Coverage on Job Linear Probability T-Statistic Probit T-statistic Marginal Probability 
1 Diabetes 0.0282 0.7344 0.0774 0.6473 0.0340 
   (0.0384)   (0.1196)     
2 PSA -0.0075 -0.6302 -0.0301 -0.8163 -0.0118 
   (0.0120)   (0.0369)     
3 TMJ 0.0091 0.3804 0.0211 0.2854 0.0083 
   (0.0238)   (0.0741)     
4 Well Child Care 0.0136 1.0856 0.0459 1.2038 0.0180 
   (0.0125)   (0.0381)     
5 New Mandate Cost Index -0.0041 -0.5976 -0.0167 -0.7964 -0.0066 
 (Also sum of mandates) (0.0068)   (0.0210)     
             
6 Age 0.0175 13.4922 0.0651 15.1999 0.0255 
   (0.0013)   (0.0043)     
7 Age squared -0.0002 -9.3636 -0.0006 -11.3277 -0.0002 
   (0.0000)   (0.0001)     
8 Education 0.0303 30.8031 0.0929 29.6327 0.0364 
   (0.0010)   (0.0031)     
9 Non-White Race -0.0560 -7.2518 -0.1644 -6.9501 -0.0634 
   (0.0077)   (0.0237)     
10 Female Sex 0.0271 3.8453 0.0823 3.6273 0.0322 
   (0.0070)   (0.0227)     
11 Married Marital Status 0.0318 4.3301 0.0820 3.7694 0.0321 
   (0.0073)   (0.0217)     
12 Married*Female -0.1744 -17.9505 -0.4890 -16.2530 -0.1843 
   (0.0097)   (0.0301)     
13 Tenure Less Than 1 Year -0.0578 -9.0342 -0.1622 -8.0304 -0.0627 
   (0.0064)   (0.0202)     
14 Union Coverage 0.1744 18.1986 0.5211 16.6803 0.2055 
   (0.0096)   (0.0312)     
15 Part-Time Status -0.2533 -43.2550 -0.8307 -39.5357 -0.2966 
   (0.0059)   (0.0210)     
16 Small Firm -0.1804 -35.5053 -0.5293 -34.8812 -0.2069 
   (0.0051)   (0.0152)     
 
NOTES: 
2. Coefficients significant at a=0.05 level are bold. 
3. Numbers is parentheses are robust standard errors. 
4. Dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual is has employment-based 
insurance coverage and 0 if not.   
5. Mandate cost is a linear combination of dummy variables for the passage of a set of mandates with 
the weights as the percentage increase from each mandate.   This variable comes from a distinct 
calculation.   
6. Results in rows 1 through 4 are from entering only a set of 4 mandate dummy variables into the 
respective model 
7. Results in row 5 through 17 are from entering only the weighted mandate index variable, which is 
also the sum of all mandates variable, in the respective model.  
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Table 6: Aggregate Model Results  
 Gruber Mandates Index 1 2  Benefit Mandates Index 3 4 
 Percent Insured Coefficient T-statistic  Percent Insured Coefficient T-statistic 
1 Alcoholism Mandate -0.0455 -1.28455  Diabetes 0.0256 0.4708 
   (0.0177) 0    (0.0544)   
2 Substance Abuse Mandate -0.0455 -1.28455  PSA -0.0104 -0.7008 
   (0.0177) 0    (0.0149)   
3 Mental Illness Mandate -0.0077 -0.5243  TMJ 0.0033 0.1493 
   (0.0146)      (0.0221)   
4 Chiropractor Mandate -0.0091 -0.4004  Well Child Care 0.0158 1.0111 
   (0.0226)      (0.0156)   
5 Sum of all mandates -0.0155 -1.4872  Sum of all mandates -0.0013 -0.2056 
   (0.0104)     (0.0064)   
6 Gruber Mandate Cost Index -0.0086 -1.3244  Benefit Mandate Cost Index -0.0013 -0.2056 
   (0.0065)      (0.0064)   
7 Age -0.0015 -0.0952  Age -0.0025 -0.1620 
   (0.0156)      (0.0154)   
8 Age squared 0.0001 0.3279  Age squared 0.0001 0.4094 
   (0.0002)      (0.0002)   
9 Education 0.0162 1.5360  Education 0.0169 1.5911 
   (0.0105)      (0.0106)   
10 Non-White Race -0.0544 -0.6973  Non-White Race -0.0433 -0.5594 
   (0.0780)      (0.0773)   
11 Female Sex -0.0360 -0.4112  Female Sex -0.0316 -0.3588 
   (0.0875)      (0.0881)   
12 Married Marital Status -0.0430 -0.5012  Married Marital Status -0.0422 -0.4938 
   (0.0857)      (0.0854)   
13 Married*Female 0.0769 0.6211  Married*Female 0.0784 0.6346 
   (0.1238)      (0.1235)   
14 Tenure Less Than 1 Year -0.0237 -0.3099  Tenure Less Than 1 Year -0.0212 -0.2781 
   (0.0765)      (0.0762)   
15 Union Coverage 0.2168 1.7723  Union Coverage 0.2259 1.8666 
   (0.1223)      (0.1210)   
16 Part-Time Status -0.2898 -4.3178  Part-Time Status -0.2884 -4.2168 
   (0.0671)      (0.0684)   
17 Small Firm -0.2271 -3.8058  Small Firm -0.2237 -3.7073 
   (0.0597)      (0.0603)   
 
Notes: 
1. Coefficients significant at a=0.05 level are bold. 
2. Numbers is parentheses are robust standard errors. 
3. Dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual is has employment-based 
insurance coverage and 0 if not.   
4. Mandate cost is a linear combination of dummy variables for the passage of a set of mandates with 
the weights as the percentage increase from each mandate.   This variable comes from a distinct 
calculation.   
5. Results in rows 1 through 4 are from entering only a set of 4 mandate dummy variables into the 
respective model. 
6. Results in row 5 are from entering only the sum of the set of 4 mandate dummy variable into the 
respective model.  Please note that for the new benefit index the sum of dummy variables is equal 
to the weighted index. 
7. Results in rows 6 through 17 are from entering only the weighted mandate index variable, which is 
also the sum of all mandates variable, in the respective model.  
 
